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CORRESPONDENCE

Self-Regulation of Judicial Misconduct
Could Be Mis-Regulationt
Anthony D'Amato*
Judge Harry T. Edwards has written a lucid and seemingly logical
plea for the judiciary to be granted exclusive self-regulation over all
matters of judicial misconduct that fall short of crimes or impeachable
offenses. 1 His essay demonstrates the seriousness with which he regards misconduct that would bring shame to the federal judiciary. He
believes that the judiciary as a whole is the best institution to ascertain
and take measures against individual aberrant judges who are guilty of
various forms of misconduct, and I have no doubt of the sincerity of
his belief. Yet when we look at claims for self-regulation in other professions - in medicine and in the police force, for example - we find
historically that progress only takes place when outside lay persons are
included on or even dominate ethics and misconduct boards. Otherwise the general operating rule is "cover it up." No matter what the
profession, any charge that a fellow professional is guilty of malpractice is a prima facie invitation to other professionals to retreat to a
guild mentality, denying that the infraction took place. The impetus
to cover up is not primarily due to friendship toward the accused but
rather to a general perception that disclosure would lead to public disrespect of the profession as a whole. The guild mentality is self-protective at the group level, and results in trumping honest disclosure in all
but the most egregious cases that would leak to the public anyway.
With respect to guild mentality, I know of no compelling distinction
for judges from doctors or police officers. Given the low salaries society gives to judges, public esteem is correspondingly an extremely important job benefit. 2 We perhaps demand too much of human nature
t
*
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1. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior" for Federal
Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765 (1989).
2. Indeed, the low salary a judge receives magnifies the importance to the judge of the softer
values of public esteem and trust. Judges can be expected to want to preserve these values. In
this respect, judges are closer to police officers (who also have low salaries and among whom
coverups are routine) than they are to doctors (who have made considerable advances in ethical
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if we expect judges to be unconcerned with the loss of public prestige
that results from admitting that cases of serious judicial misconduct
are not extraordinarily rare.
But placing these general misgivings to one side, my particular
quarrel with Judge Edwards' essay has three aspects: first, that his
perception of the problem may be distorted due to the legal culture in
which he is perhaps unselfconsciously immersed; second, that he
places an untenably narrow positivistic interpretation on the "good
behavior" language of the Constitution; and third, that his failure even
to mention what may be one of the most significant areas of judicial
misconduct, namely, lack of candor in judicial opinions, proves a certain institutional blindness to misconduct that undercuts his entire
plea. I conclude this essay by suggesting that lack of candor is just an
example, although perhaps the most important one, of the danger of
entrusting solely to the judiciary the policing of its own members.

I.

THE JUDICIAL SELF-REGULATORY CULTURE

Judge Edwards' article reveals a microcultural bias that affects his
entire approach to his subject. In the course of criticizing the Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 3 he
says that its difficulties "reflect the legislature's naivete about judicial
problems."4 The theory of the Act, he writes, is that by "institut[ing]
formal procedures intended to promote and expedite legitimate complaints against errant judges," people will be encouraged to make complaints by assurance "that their petitions will be considered
seriously." 5 Then he adds: "However, in reality, the formality only
encourages disappointed litigants to make unfocused, nonlegally
grounded charges. . . . [R]eports show that most complaints come
from litigants who have lost cases before the accused judge."6 I contend that this passage betrays a distinct bias against all complaints of
judicial misbehavior. It is clear to any impartial observer that litigants
who win a case will not file complaints against the judge who awarded
them the favorable decision. No matter how serious a judge's misconduct, the odds are overwhelming that winning litigants will "leave well
enough alone." To do anything else might jeopardize the favorable
training and evaluations at the clinical level, in addition to being subject to review by hospital
ethics boards which were more or less forced upon doctors by the public).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
4. Edwards, supra note 1, at 789.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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result in the case. Therefore, practically the only complaints will
come from "disappointed litigants."
Because Judge Edwards must surely appreciate the fact that only
disappointed litigants tend to file misbehavior complaints, his observations reveal an underlying guild mentality: "How dare these people
criticize our individual performance as judges? They are nothing but
disgruntled malcontents. They have no idea how hard we work for
the public good, and that in every case one party has to lose." Judge
Edwards dismisses all complainants summarily by this sour grapes
view of them. 7 His bias operates to prejudice any future complaint, no
matter how meritorious. His position reveals his own prejudice
against complaints in general - a prejudice that hardly supports his
position that judges are the best neutral adjudicators of the misbehavior of their colleagues.
Evidence that the "sour grapes" attitude is part of the judicial
microculture and not peculiar to Judge Edwards can be found in the
way the federal judiciary has implemented the 1980 Act. The clear
purpose of the Act was to alert the judiciary to situations of judicial
misconduct or disability in the interests of the effective and expeditious
administration of justice. 8 The Act permits "[a]ny person" to be a
complainant;9 the complainant is obviously a facilitator of the statutory purpose and not a party in interest. 10 Since there may be some
persons who want to report instances of judicial misconduct but may
be afraid to reveal their identities - such as lawyers, clerks, court
employees, and (in a smaller community) prominent civic leaders or
businesspersons - encouraging these people to file complaints would
be consistent with, if not required by, the purpose of the Act. 11 Yet in
one case, two lawyers were publicly reprimanded and fined $500 each
for filing disciplinary charges against a judge. 12 The "model rules"
prepared by a special committee of a conference of the chief judges of
7. In 1986, there were 277 complaints under the Act. The chief judges· acting alone dismissed 229 of them, and the remaining 48, 39 were dismissed by the judicial councils. In only 8
cases was corrective action taken. The one remaining case was withdrawn. Rieger, The Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act: Will Judges Judge Judges?, 31 EMORY
L.J. 45, 59 (1988).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(l) (1988).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(l) (1988).
10. For example, there is no provision for changing the result in a complainant's lawsuit, nor
for awarding the complainant damages, if the complainant's charge of judicial misconduct is
found to be meritorious.
11. The Act does provide for notice to the complainant of decisions taken, an opportunity to
appear at certain proceedings, and an opportunity to petition for review if dissatisfied with the
disposition of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1988). Surely these privileges are available to a
complainant who might choose anonymity.
12. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 2 Ct. Cl. 255, 262 (1983).
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the various courts of appeals to implement the Act would appear to
deter anyone, lawyers included, from filing complaints. The model
rules specifically require that the complainant sign the complaint and
verify it under oath or declaration. 13 The special committee explained
that "this requirement is probably not of the greatest importance," but
said that it "may deter occasional abuse of the complaint process." 14
Was the special committee candid in its explanation? Surely the price
for deterring "occasional abuse" could tend to be destructive of the
purpose of the Act. Requiring a signature and verification could deter
all complainants who might selflessly want to improve the justice system but who are afraid ofrevealing their identity for fear ofreprisals. 15
Nevertheless, all the circuits that have issued rules and forms implementing the 1980 Act have adopted the requirement of identification
of the complainant. 16
Although at the present writing all circuits apparently have issued
forms substantially similar to the model forms suggested by the Chief
Judges, the Third Circuit experimented with its own rules and forms
for the period 1984-1987. The direction it took did not improve the
task of complainants. Indeed, the Third Circuit's version was substantially more restrictive and intimidating than the Chief Judges'
model.17
13. ILLUSTRATIVE RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DIS•
ABILITY 8 (Rule 2(f)) (Federal Judicial Center 1986).
14. Id. at 10.
15. Information from anonymous sources still may be considered by the chief judges in their
role as chairpersons of the circuit judicial councils; the 1980 Act does not revoke that practice.
See id. at 11. But the Act itself cannot be triggered by an anonymous complainant when the
implementing rules require signature and verification.
16. See U.S. Ct. of App. 2d Cir. Appendix (Rules of the Judicial Council of the Second
Circuit Governing Complaints Against Judicial Officer Under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) Rule 2(f)), 28
U.S.C.A. (1990); U.S. Ct. of App. 3d Cir. Appendix V, Rule 2{f), 28 U.S.C.A. (1990); U.S. Ct. of
App. 4th Cir. Appendix I, Rule 2(f) 28 U.S.C.A. (1990); U.S. Ct. of App. 8th Cir. Appendix IV,
Rule 1, 28 U.S.C.A. (1990); U.S. Ct. of App. 11th Cir. Addendum III, Rule 2{f), 28 U.S.C.A.
(1990); Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Governing Com·
plaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability 3 (Rule 2{f)) (1987).
17. The 1984-1987 Complaint Form for the Third Circuit states on the first page that "All
questions must be answered concisely in the proper space on the form. Where more room is
needed to answer any question, use the reverse side of the page. Additional pages are not permit·
ted." United States Court of Appeals {Third Circuit) Judicial Council, Rules of the Judicial
Council of the Third Circuit With Respect to Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability
43-46 (Appendix) (Nov. 14, 1984). The Complaint Form in its entirety will frustrate any filer
who attempts to follow these initial instructions. Questions 3, 4, and 5 each have different rules
regarding the available room to answer. Question 3 states: "If the space provided is insufficient,
use the bottom of Page 46." Question 4 requires the complainant to answer the question "in the
space provided below." Question 5 specifically directs the complainant to answer the question in
the space provided and then to use "the reverse side of the page." The most frustrating question
is Question 3. It reads:
Tell your story briefly, including the grounds upon which your complaint is based and the
facts supporting them. Describe how the judge or magistrate whose conduct is the subject
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The insistence that a complainant disclose his identity and assume
the risk of an indictment for perjury seems sharply at variance with
Judge Edwards' own characterization of the intent of Congress in
passing the 1980 Act - "to promote and expedite legitimate complaints against errant judges." 18 But if Judge Edwards wants to use
the Form as a guillotine to separate legitimate from illegitimate complaints, 19 Judge Aldisert, who wrote an introduction to the experimental Rules of the Third Circuit that were in effect from 1984 to 1987,
wanted the form to do the work of weeding out improper attempts to
seek review of the substantive merits of the case. He claimed that the
Rules "provide an efficient and fair procedure to delineate the important distinction between a genuine complaint of judicial misconduct
and an improper attempt to seek review of the substantive merits of a
case or controversy." 20 The distinction may be "important" to Judge
Aldisert, but I doubt that it will ever be clear. Indeed it becomes increasingly fuzzy as the gravity of the judicial misconduct increases. A
complainant will very likely believe that the presiding judge, who in
of the complaint is involved. Include also the names of other persons involved, dates and
places. Do not give any legal arguments or cite any cases or statutes. If the space provided
is insufficient, use the bottom of Page 46.
The "space provided" consists of thirteen ruled lines. The extra space on Page 46 is a blank
space containing an additional twelve lines (assuming the same spacing as the previous ruled
lines). Because Rule (2) of the Instructions provides that no pages may be added to the Complaint, and because the general rule that one may write on the back of a page is contradicted by
the more specific rules accompanying Questions 3, 4, and 5, it is clear - well, clear except to the
most intrepid or foolhardy - that the complainant has twenty-five lines, and no more, to "tell
your story briefly."
·
Suppose a disappointed litigant, who believes that the judge misbehavecI and may even have a
mental disability, tries to tell her story briefly in 25 lines. She soon discovers, after listing "the
names of other persons involved, dates, and places," which Question 3 requires her to do, that
she has very little space remaining to tell what happened. If her story is at all complex, and the
grounds of her suspicion are at all impressionistic (rarely will judicial misbehavior be so gross as
to be obvious on the face of the record), she will hardly have adequate space. If she believes that
the judge either has a mental abnormality or has behaved irrationally or drunkenly, it will be
extremely difficult for her to describe the judge's conduct in a few lines while confining herself
solely to the reporting of objective facts. Even psychologists find it difficult to describe aberrant
behavior in wholly objective, factual terms, and their case studies are not notorious for brevity.
Unless the complainant can write with the precision and economy of Jane Austen, she runs the
risk of being prosecuted for perjury. And she has further reason to fear the possibility that the
persons who will sit in judgment at her perjury trial will be the same judges, or their colleagues,
who misconstrued her complaint in the first place.
18. Edwards, supra note l, at 789.
19. To be sure, one might construe the word "legitimate" so as to justify the complaint form:
the form is set out the way it is to weed out illegitimate complaints. But the word "legitimate"
always begs the question - especially so in the present context where the ultimate deciders of
what is or is not "legitimate" are the colleagues of the person accused of misconduct. In any
event, there are other equally possible constructions of the word "legitimate" in the statute - for
example, that Congress really wants to give legitimate complaints a chance of succeeding, and
not that it wants to ensure at all costs that illegitimate complaints be discouraged.
20. Third Circuit Rules, supra note 17, at iii (Introduction by Chief Judge Ruggero J.
Aldisert).
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her view misbehaved, rendered a clearly unjust verdict. 21 She may
indeed believe that the misbehavior caused the unjust verdict, and that
the unjust verdict constitutes at least some evidence of the misbehavior. She will thus find it almost impossible to separate her complaint
about the misconduct from her view that the decision itself was unjust
on the merits. She may well believe that as soon as the other judges
read her complaint, they will spot the clear injustice in the ruling almost as if it were an uncontrovertible fact. In this regard, she is a
typical member of the public, secure in the belief that the adjudicatory
system normally produces just results. 22 She is almost certain to be
bitterly disappointed. She may lack the mindset of lawyers and judges
who have learned through experience that the system produces many
unjust results, that in practice law and justice can be entirely different
things.
The Edwards-Aldisert-Third Circuit approach reflects this insider
view. Their approach appears to assume that the public shares the
profession's cynical views about justice. Nothing else explains Judge
Aldisert's notion that the very form the Third Circuit has implemented will unerringly guide a complainant to bifurcate her convictions regarding a judge's misbehavior and the obvious unjustness of
that judge's ruling.
Both Judge Edwards' attempt to use the rules to weed out illegitimate complaints and Judge Aldisert's attempt to separate misbehavior
from unjust results - and the additional fact that neither of them for
a moment questions the propriety or overdeterrence of criminal prosecution for perjury if a complainant steps over their lines - illustrate
not so much the jurisprudential futility of attempting to have any form
do this kind of heavy work, but rather the judges' own cultural presuppositions. If they have made the path to complaining about judicial
misbehavior rocky, narrow, incoherent, and fraught with peril, they
presumably have done so not out of absent mindedness but rather because they want to discourage complaints.
The judges' efforts appear to have worked. Professor Carol T. Rieger has reported on the implementation of the 1980 Act. 23 From Oc21. Of course, a complainant might feel that the verdict was "against the law." Clearly,
disappointed litigants should not be able to use the Act as a quasi·appellate procedure. The Act
itself states that a complaint should be dismissed if found to be "directly related to the merits of a
decision or procedural ruling." 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii) (1988). But a decision against the
law is not necessarily a decision against justice. Accordingly, in the text I have talked only about
decisions that appear to be contrary to justice.
22. For an example of a law professor's outrage at a decision that seemed to him clearly at
variance with law and justice, see Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, - IOWA L. REv. - (forthcoming).
23. Rieger, supra note 7.
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tober 1981, the effective date of the Act, through June 1986, only 309
complaints were filed under the Act - an average of 65 complaints
per year. 24 "Corrective action" was taken only in 8 cases - less than
3% of the complaints filed. Professor Rieger comments on the nature
of this "corrective action":
Not all circuits make their decisions public, so it is not possible to tell
what all of these "corrective actions" might be. In the dispositions
which are public, some simply make the cryptic comment that "appropriate corrective action has been taken," without revealing the nature of
the conduct or the remedial action. Most of the other public dispositions
under the "Corrective Action Taken" label indicate that the Chief Judge
has talked with the judge or magistrate against whom a complaint was
filed, and he or she expressed regret about how the particular action or
words complained of were interpreted by the complaining party, and an
intention not to do it again. 25

In sum, the very procedures set up by the judiciary betray a distinctly unfavorable disposition toward complaints about misbehavior
of their fellows. These procedures provide no reassurance that judges
can or should self-regulate cases of judicial misconduct. But if his normative appeal fails, Judge Edwards has a constitutional string to his
bow.

II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT

Judge Edwards turns to the Constitution to argue that, like it or
not, only judges can judge the misbehavior of judges. He contends
that the Constitution mandates that the judiciary retain the exclusive
power of self-regulation for all acts of judicial misconduct that fall
short of crimes or impeachable offenses.

A.

The Reductionist Move

Judge Edwards devotes most of his essay to an analysis of the good
behavior clause of article III, which states that judges "shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour." I would imagine that a normal reading of this clause suggests that a badly behaving judge must not be
allowed to stay in office. Not so, says Judge Edwards. He finds in the
impeachment clauses in articles I and II the sole means and standard
for removing judges from office; hence, any judge who is not successfully impeached may remain in office despite the apparent meaning of
24. Id. at 46. Compare the statistic that between 1984 and 1987, following the decision in
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (attorneys' fees may be awarded when a plaintiff wins a
suit against a judge for injunctive or declaratory relief), approximately 1500 cases were filed
against state judicial officers. McMillion, Restoring Judicial Immunity, 16 A.B.A. J. 107 (1990).
25. Rieger, supra note 7, at 58-59 (footnotes omitted).
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the good behavior clause. The standard for impeachment is "high
crimes and misdemeanors," and the means is Congress. However,
Judge Edwards would not drain the good behavior clause of all meaning. He believes that it stands for a basic principle, one that he finds
meritorious - the principle of judicial independence. This appears to
be a rather magical principle in Judge Edwards' hands, because once it
is produced, the actual words of the clause disappear.
Judge Edwards bolsters his vanishingly narrow interpretation of
the good behavior clause by reference to both the principle of judicial
independence and the doctrine of separation of powers. Because he
finds the notion of judicial independence to be derived from the good
behavior clause itself - the very clause he is trying to construe - it
hardly constitutes independent support for his position. Judge Edwards' argument is severely reductionist: clause X boils down to principle Y, then principle Y rises up to lop off anything in clause X
inconsistent with principle Y. In his hands, the good behavior clause
in effect reads: ''judges shall hold their offices during good or bad
behavior."
To bolster a weak position, Judge Edwards shifts his ground to the
doctrine of separation of powers. He finds that the "principle of judicial independence is actually an outgrowth of the separation of powers
doctrine." 26 To be sure, Judge Edwards admits that "[t]he Constitution says nothing about separation of powers per se; it speaks only of
the assignment of powers." 27 He further concedes that each branch
has the power to check the actions of the others. 28 But "checking" is
apparently one thing and "meddling" another, according to Judge Edwards. "Checking" is consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers but "meddling" is not. Although the Constitution says nothing about meddling, apparently "separation of powers" for Judge Edwards is precisely equivalent to "thou shalt not meddle."
If history has taught us anything about checking and meddling, it
is that when Branch A of government tries to supervise the activities of
Branch B, Branch A always characterizes its own actions as checking,
whereas Branch B invariably characterizes the very same actions as
meddling. Surely the words "checking" and "meddling" are merely
clashing forms of rhetoric. Yet Judge Edwards gives us an example one that illuminates his general outlook. Lower federal courts, he
26. Edwards, supra note 1, at 767. His use of the word "actually" in this sentence suggests
an abandonment of his previous reliance on the good behavior clause as establishing judicial
independence.
27. Id. at 781.
28. Id. at 782.
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states, have prudentially refrained from deciding cases involving internal congressional affairs even though jurisdiction for judicial action
might otherwise be found. 29 "We are reluctant to meddle in the internal affairs of the legislative branch," said one such court. 30 Judge Edwards quotes his own concurrence in a recent case: "Reciprocal
respect for the courts suggests that Congress should, and arguably
must, be equally reluctant to impose its preferences on the judiciary's
governance of its internal affairs." 31 Putting aside the question of
what is "internal" - even though such a question points up the tautology of the entire construction - the message Judge Edwards and
his colleagues are actually sending to Congress is: we didn't meddle
with you, so don't meddle with us.
But as we examine this example, we see that its reasoning hides
under a reciprocity mask the possibility that it was judicial fear of
congressional interference with the judiciary that gave rise to this
"prudential" judicial doctrine of nonmeddling in the first place. If so,
the entire argument is self-consuming. We can hardly credit judicial
passivity in these cases to some "legal" doctrine; it is rather a perceived (and perhaps from the viewpoint of the players a rational) selfprotection mechanism. The courts may have decided not to "meddle"
(as Congress might perceive it) in internal congressional affairs for the
very reason that such self-restraint might ward off congressional
"meddling" (as the judiciary might perceive it) in judicial affairs. This
kind of don't-scratch-my-back-and-I-won't-scratch-yours surely has
nothing to do with justice, the Constitution, or checks and balances
(except for the most devout followers of Alexander Bickel), but it has
everything to do with judges watching out for themselves. Surely
then, what amounts to another example of guild mentality should not
count as a constitutional reason to eviscerate the good behavior clause.
B.

The Positivist Move

As we have seen, because Judge Edwards believes that the sole basis to remove a judge is through the impeachment process, he gives no
independent meaning to the good behavior clause. There is perhaps
some support for his argument as a narrow positivistic stance. If positivism (of the decidedly Austinian variety) says that "law" only has
29. Id. at 784.
30. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985).
31. Edwards, supra note 1, at 785 (quoting Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United
States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter "Hastings I"] (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 904 (1986).
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"bite" where there is a remedy, and rules without remedies are not
"law," 32 one might say that only the impeachment clause, in this context, provides a remedy (removal from office). Hence, compared to it,
the good behavior clause is just a placeholder (or just "positive morality" in Austin's classic sense).
Yet we do not have to be originalists to acknowledge that the
Framers were not Austinian positivists. I think it is quite realistic to
attribute to them a natural law (or right reason, Blackstonian) perspective that a judge should not hold office if the judge engaged in
behavior so bad that he could no longer properly be called a "judge."
Even if the Framers had never adverted33 to some of the following
possibilities, so long as we attribute rationality to their intentions we
can say with some confidence that they would have regarded at least
certain kinds of judicial misconduct to be destructive of the title
''judge." These kinds of judicial misconduct may fall short of "high
crimes or misdemeanors" - they may not be criminal at all - yet
nevertheless constitute such nongood behavior as to make the actor a
nonjudge. Take, for example, a judge who decides cases according to
(a) the flip of a coin, (b) the comparative wealth of plaintiff and defendant, (c) the comparative size of contributions by counsel to the
judge's nomination, 34 or (d) friendship with certain attorneys who appear before him. These forms of conduct clearly violate the "good
behavior" requirement though not the impeachment standard. Thus
the sole basis for removing such judges appears to be the good behavior clause. Can there be any doubt that such judges, if they engage in
one or more of those kinds of behavior, should not remain in office?
Indeed, once one visualizes and takes seriously these particular forms
of judicial misconduct that fall short of high crimes or misdemeanors,
one marvels once again at the intellectual comprehensiveness of the
32. The exact opposite, by the way, of Justice Marshall's reasoning in Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1Cranch)137 (1803) (Marbury had a "right," therefore he had a right to a "remedy,'' but
not from this Court).
33. It is not at all unusual to attribute to someone a particular purpose that never crossed
that person's mind. This is the point of Wittgenstein's famous observation, "Someone says to
me: 'Shew the children a game.' I teach them gaming with dice, and the other says 'I didn't
mean that sort of game.' Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come before his mind
when he gave me the order?" L. WITIGENSfEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS§ 70 (attached slip) (1953). Probate judges often make this move in deciding what the testator would
have intended had he or she known certain facts (which occurred after the testator's death).
34. Even though federal judges do not run for office, counsel may support a judge through
public advocacy and behind-the-scenes support for the judge during the nomination process.
(Many practicing attorneys are afraid to speak out against nominees to the federal bench because
of possible reprisals against them if the nominee they oppose is appointed.) In the context of
many state courts, the potential for abuse is more obvious: a judge may decide in favor of counsel who contributed more to the judge's campaign for office. See Sixty Minutes: Justice for Sale?
(television program on the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation, of Dec. 6, 1987).
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Framers in actually providing language - the good behavior clause that should give Congress a check-and-balance power to remove false
or dishonest judges. 3s
Ill.

A

TEST CASE: CANDOR IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS

There is one form of judicial misconduct that I think clinches the
case against Judge Edwards' position: lack of candor in judicial opinions. One of the worst things a judge can do is to ignore or misstate
the critical facts or critical legal issues in a case. Since this kind of
misconduct is not generally considered a "crime" nor an impeachable
offense, 36 it would fall squarely within the realm of judicial misbehavior that Judge Edwards leaves to the judiciary to regulate.
Surprisingly, Judge Edwards does not even mention lack of candor
as a form of judicial misbehavior in an essay that lists many other
forms of judicial misconduct. His omission is, I think, part of the (perhaps unselfconscious) guild mentality that I mentioned earlier, for I
have not come across any essay or book by any judge that considers
seriously the problem of lack of candor in opinion-writing. I suggest
that this thundering silence is not due to a general lack of awareness of
the problem, but rather reflects a deeply imbedded fear that such a
matter is the dirtiest of linen that should not be displayed in public.
Consider a recent, gutsy speech given to the Federal Circuit Judicial
35. Given the "high tone" style of the Constitution, the Committee on Style might well have
decided not to put the matter negatively ("judges who misbehave shall be removed from office")
but rather positively Gudges "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour").
Judge Edwards argues that a misbehaving judge does not necessarily have to be removed
from office. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 794-95. There are other sanctions, such as progressively lightening the misbehaving judge's case docket, so as to cut down the opportunities for
mischief. But this kind of "punishment" can backfire; a "lazy" judge who simply wants to draw
full salary for doing as little work as possible might be positively encouraged to misbehave so that
his workload will be deliberately reduced. So long as his misbehavior falls short of an impeachable offense, he may succeed in maximizing his hourly income. His example may have a deleterious effect on honest and overworked judges. Thus, by reading out of the good behavior clause
the ultimate penalty of removal from office, Judge Edwards may have succeeded only in setting
up an intolerable situation where misbehavior is actually rewarded by reducing the miscreant
judge's workload. Compare the complaint recently filed with the Judicial Review Council of
Connecticut alleging that Judge Edward F. Stodolink "has voiced his disdain of personally adjudicating matrimonial disputes and has frequently threatened attorneys with the likelihood of an
unsatisfactory result if forced to preside over such disputes." Complaint of Theodore Kamasinski Against Judge Edward F. Stodolink of the Danbury Superior Court (Oct. 23, 1990).
36. This is the current state of the law - even though the misconduct may result in deliberately incarcerating an innocent person or in another form of substantial injustice. It is a far cry
from the origins of common law in England.
In earliest English law not only was immunity of judges not recognized, but review of judicial decisions was in the form of a personal action against the judge. The consequences of a
false judgment, a malicious judgment, or an action outside the judge's authority were severe
for the judge and the jurisdiction he represented.
Feinman & Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C. L. REv. 201, 205 (1980).
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Conference by one of the nation's leading scholars on judicial ethics,
Professor Monroe Freedman:
Frankly, I have had more than enough of judicial opinions that bear no
relationship whatsoever to the cases that have been filed and argued
before the judges. I am talking about judicial opinions that falsify the
facts of the cases that have been argued, judicial opinions that make disingenuous use or omission of material authorities, judicial opinions that
cover up these things with no-publication and no-citation rules. 37

Professor Freedman wrote a letter to me in which he stated that at the
luncheon immediately following his speech, a judge sitting next to him
said (apropos of the passage above quoted), "you don't know the half
of it!"38
The possibility of judges changing the facts of a case came home to
me in connection with a federal habeas petition I filed in the Seventh
Circuit. 39 In its detailed recitation of the facts of the case, a threejudge panel of the Court of Appeals omitted mention of earwitness
testimony for the prosecution that established the time of the murder
as occurring when the defendant was proved to be a mile and a half
away tending patients in a hospital. 40 The earwitness' testimony was
prominent in the jury trial and it was uncontroverted. By omitting a
primary fact that proved the defendant was not at the scene of the
crime - and by ignoring other facts which also proved that the defendant could not have committed the crime - the Court of Appeals
was able to construct possible guilt out of circumstantial evidence. 41
37. M. Freedman, Speech to the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (May 24, 1989), reprinted in 128 F.R.D. 409, 439
(1989).
38. Letter from Monroe Freedman to Anthony D'Amato, Oct. 14, 1989 (quoted with the
permission of Professor Freedman).
39. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1988), rehg. denied, No. 87-3052 (Sept. 2,
1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1645 (1989). Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, joined by Judges Manion and Eschbach.
40. At the trial the neighbor said she heard "sounds," and throughout the rest of the trial the
prosecutor and defense attorney referred to her testimony as the testimony about the "shots."
The assistant prosecutor, in closing, referred to it as the "sounds of the gun." Judge Easterbrook
at one point in his opinion included a mention of the next-door-neighbor's testimony in a parenthetical comment on the opinion of district court Judge Getzendanner. He said, "Judge
Getzendanner had a different theory: Branion left the Hospital before 11:30 and killed his wife (a
neighbor reported hearing a commotion in the Branion apartment before 11:30), returned to the
Hospital to establish his presence away from the scene of the crime, and only then picked up his
son." 855 F.2d at 1261. Because Judge Easterbrook found that Judge Getzendanner's theory of
the crime was erroneous, because he labeled it a "theory," and because he only used the word
"commotion," no reader of his opinion could imagine that Judge Easterbrook was referring to
the exculpatory fact that the murder occurred when the defendant was a mile and a half away
from the scene of the crime, particularly since it was the prosecution that elicited the evidence
from its own witness and did not controvert it.
41. It should be acknowledged here that the posture of the case before the Seventh Circuit
was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and calls for the evidence to be evaluated in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, rather than a full review as if on direct appeal. However, even
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I presented a paper at an international conference in honor of Jacques Derrida detailing the evidence in this case and specifying the
Court's omission of the primary exculpatory fact (as well as several
other critical omissions and distortions). The paper was entitled "The
Ultimate Injustice: When a Court Misstates the Facts."42 This paper
was reported at length in the "At the Bar" column of The New York
Times.43 Many attorneys, judges, and law professors who saw the
Times column wrote to me. A New York attorney, who was formerly
an Administrative Law Judge, said in reference to one of his cases, "I
have been shocked to find that the courts invented testimony to support their conclusions. " 44 A Florida attorney wrote, "I have received
opinions in which the appellate court has deliberately misstated the
facts in order to make a difficult and complex question disappear, in
order to justify a judicial vigilantism, or in order simply to bolster a
decision which the appellate court would have made in any event."45
The attorney candidly added, "I have been both the beneficiary and
the victim of such tactics." 46 A Georgia lawyer wrote, "I have had a
similar experience where the appellate court simply fabricated the
facts." 47 A final example is from a Boston attorney who says that the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts "engaged in almost precisely
the sort of legerdemain you are reported to have criticized."48
Every practicing attorney with whom I have discussed the matter
of lack of judicial candor has told me of at least one case when it
clearly happened to him or to her, and some say that the practice is
unfortunately quite common. What good is adversarial argument, one
this standard would require some discussion as to why the earwitness testimony was not
dispositive.
42. The symposium was entitled "Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice," and was
held at Cardozo Law School, New York City, on October 2, 1989. A slightly edited version of
the paper was subsequently published. See D'Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court
Misstates the Facts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1323 (1990).
43. Margolick, A Law Professor with a Beef Takes the Judge to Task and the Case to the
Public, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1989, at BS, cols. 1-2.
44. Letter from Thomas Redmond Matais, Esq., to Professor Anthony D'Amato, Mar. 20,
1990.
45. Letter from Joel S. Perwin, Esq., to Professor Anthony D'Amato, Oct. 17, 1989. Mr.
Perwin in his letter cites a U.S. Supreme Court reversal of one of his appellate cases "which
implicitly acknowledged the lower appellate court's factual misstatement by stating the facts in a
manner directly opposite to the lower court's statement." See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 483 n.27 (1985), revg. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1512-13
(11th Cir. 1984).
46. Letter from Joel S. Perwin, Esq., to Professor Anthony D'Amato, supra note 45.
47. Letter from J. Michael Raffaufto Professor Anthony D'Amato, Oct. 13, 1989. Mr. Raffauf cites the case of Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 864 F.2d 734 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
70 (1989).
48. Letter from Richard L. Dahlen, Esq., to Professor Anthony D'Amato, Oct. 13, 1989.
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of them asked, if a judge can play God with the facts of a case? Some
attorneys have told me that if they had known that the practice of law
would be like this, they would have chosen a different profession.4 9
Surely when a critical fact is proved and undisputed at trial, the whole
legal world seems to crumble when the losing attorney sees no mention of the fact in the judge's written opinion or sees that the judge
relied explicitly on a contrary unproved "fact." Hardly anything
could be more unfair.
Arguably there is an incentive in the judicial system to misstate the
facts of a case. Judges hate to be reversed; many grade their own performance by how small a percentage of their cases are reversed on
appeal. By misstating the facts of a case - if misstatement is necessary to "justify" a desired result - a judge can all but ensure that her
decision will not be reversed on appeal. Higher courts are uninterested in retrying disputations about facts; they are only interested in
"law." 50 They will be impatient with arguments of counsel that the
facts were otherwise than as found by the trial judge. They say repeatedly that they have no time to plunge into the morass of fact-determination. Hence, a judge who invents or misstates a critical fact in favor
of the party to whom she decides to award the decision may well have
high confidence that her decision will thus be insulated from reversal
by a higher court.st
49. They also invariably add that they are themselves in no position to blow the whistle for
fear of retaliation by the judge they criticize or by the judge's colleagues.
50. A higher court itself may misstate a written source. Consider the recent decision by the
Illinois Supreme Court in In re Peel, 126 Ill. 2d 397 (1989), revd., Peel v. Attorney Reg. &
Disciplinary Commn., 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990). An attorney placed on his letterhead the words
"Certified Civil Trial Specialist By the National Board of Trial Advocacy." The Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission recommended that the attorney be censured for
holding out to the public that he was "certified" as a specialist. In imposing the sanction of
censure on the attorney, the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion cited the Webster's dictionary
definition of "certificate" as "a document issued by .•• a state agency ... certifying that one has
satisfactorily ... attained professional standing in a given field and may officially practice or hold
a position in that field." 126 Ill. 2d at 405, citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 366 (1986). When the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Court's attention
was drawn to the elisions in the Illinois Supreme Court's quotation from Webster's. The full
quotation is: "a document issued by a school, a state agency, or a professional organization certifying that one has satisfactorily completed a course of studies, has passed a qualifying examination, or has attained professional standing in a given field and may officially practice or hold a
position in that field." 110 s. Ct. at 2289, citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY, supra, at 367 (emphasis added to portions omitted from 126 Ill. 2d at 405). In
short, the portion of the definition omitted by the Illinois Supreme Court supports the opposite of
that court's conclusion; it justifies the attorney's use of "certified" in his letterhead instead of
impeaching it.
51. Perhaps the origin of such judicial misbehavior is a failure of law professors to teach factdetermination in law schools. By concentrating on deductive and pseudo-deductive legal systematization, we deliver the message to those of our students who will someday become judges that
facts of cases are uninteresting and that the real intellectual excitement comes from disputing the
content of "the law."
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Do all judges more or less share in occasional misstating or omission of facts? I believe that the majority of judges are honest persons
of great integrity who would not consciously do such a thing. Nevertheless, many judges may feel that their own standing in the community could be undermined by disclosures that other judges invent or
misstate facts. The issue here is not which judges have integrity, but
rather that the judicial culture itself apparently has little room for
countenancing disclosure of misbehavior that could undermine public
confidence in the judiciary.52 I would be far more disposed toward
accepting Judge Edwards' plea for judicial self-regulation if I were to
see concrete evidence of judges themselves bringing up the matter of
candor in opinion-writing and offering practical suggestions as to how
self-regulation can curb and eventually eliminate judicial invention or
misstatement of facts.

52. Compare Plato's view of "justice" in The Laws: institutions of justice exist to stabilize a
society rather than do justice; what is impermissible is the appearance of injustice rather than
injustice itself. Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod. Aeschylus and
Plato, 54 TENN. L. REV. 279, 321-24 (1987).

